Vigilante border checks strain Dutch-German ties as official controls are extended

What’s happening at the Dutch–German border
Citizen-run patrols have started stopping people near the Dutch–German border, and Berlin is not amused. Two senior German officials have pressed The Hague to shut these operations down, arguing that private citizens have no legal grounds to conduct searches or ID checks at a border crossing—especially not one inside the Schengen zone. The timing is sensitive: the Netherlands has just extended its official border controls until December 9, 2025.
Those official checks, handled by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (the country’s military police), began on December 9, 2024, citing risks tied to irregular migration, smuggling networks, secondary movements within the EU, and a spike in criminal incidents around reception centers. The government used Article 25 of the Schengen Border Code, which lets a member state bring back internal border controls for a limited period when there’s a serious threat to public policy or internal security.
Since the rollout, the Marechaussee has controlled more than 80,000 people, including 55,360 EU citizens, and checked nearly 18,000 vehicles. The tally so far: 360 people refused entry, 170 arrests, and several hundred transfers to and from neighboring states. These are targeted, risk-based checks—think prioritized road crossings, international trains, and selected flights—run by trained officers with clear legal powers.
Now add citizen patrols into the mix. The rise of vigilante border checks has complicated an already tense policy environment. Unlike official patrols, these civilian efforts don’t have a legal mandate. German authorities say they’re worried about public safety, harassment, and unlawful profiling. Dutch authorities have not endorsed the vigilantes, and Berlin wants The Hague to step in before the situation spirals or someone gets hurt.
Why the friction? Schengen’s promise is frictionless travel inside the bloc. When a country temporarily brings back internal checks, it has to justify the move, keep it proportionate, and keep Brussels in the loop. Unofficial checkpoints by private citizens break that chain of accountability and make police cooperation across the border harder, not easier.
- People checked by the Marechaussee: 80,000+
- EU citizens among them: 55,360
- Vehicles checked: ~18,000
- Refused entry: 360
- Arrests: 170
- Transfers between countries: several hundred
These numbers are not small. They suggest the official operation is active and producing cases, which is exactly why Berlin wants the civilian side-shows stopped. Unauthorized checks muddy evidence chains, risk rights violations, and could taint legitimate cases if defense lawyers argue that stops were triggered by illegal citizen actions.

What the law allows—and why diplomats are worried
The Schengen Border Code is clear about who can reintroduce checks and how. Only the state can restore controls, and only trained officers can exercise those powers. Article 25 is the gateway clause used by the Netherlands here: it covers temporary internal checks in response to serious threats. Those checks must be time-limited, proportionate, and reviewed. The extension to December 2025 signals The Hague still sees a credible risk picture along the borders with Germany and Belgium.
Citizen involvement is different. Like most EU countries, the Netherlands allows a narrow “citizen’s arrest” when someone is caught in the act of a crime. But stopping vehicles, inspecting documents, searching bags, or questioning travelers about immigration status—those are police powers. Impersonating an officer, obstructing traffic, or coercing people into ID checks can trigger criminal charges. That’s why Berlin is flagging the risk now, before copycat groups grow or confrontations escalate.
There’s also a cross-border policing angle. Dutch and German forces already cooperate on the frontier, sharing data within legal limits and coordinating through joint centers and liaison channels. Unofficial patrols cut across that architecture. If a civilian group detains someone, which side is responsible? Who documents the stop? Which law applies? Without a lawful framework, evidence could be tossed, and civil claims could follow.
Human rights law adds another layer. Border checks inside Schengen must be targeted and based on risk, not blanket controls or appearance-based profiling. Officers are trained on proportionality and documentation. Civilians are not. That gap exposes travelers to abuse and the state to litigation if it’s seen as tolerating private enforcement.
Politically, this is happening against a familiar European backdrop. Since 2015, several Schengen states have switched internal checks on and off in response to migration pressures and security alerts. The Netherlands is now in that cycle. Officials argue that smugglers adapt fast and that trains, highways, and short-haul flights are key vectors. The results listed by the Marechaussee—refusals, arrests, and transfers—are being used to justify keeping the operation going a bit longer.
What happens next? Expect The Hague to restate that only the Marechaussee and police can run checks, remind the public about the narrow limits of citizen intervention, and coordinate with German counterparts to keep the frontier calm. If vigilante groups keep at it, local prosecutors could make an example with charges tied to impersonation, unlawful coercion, or public order violations. On the diplomatic side, Berlin will watch for clear enforcement signals and cleaner lines between official and unofficial activity.
The border itself won’t close. These are targeted checks inside Schengen, not a hard border wall. But they’re politically sensitive and legally technical. That’s why both capitals want fewer surprises—and why untrained civilian patrols are a red line for Germany right now.